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Abstract 
Background: Neuroticism is associated with inflated somatic symptom reporting. Worry and 
rumination are a cognitive concomitant of neuroticism and potentially mediate the 
neuroticism-somatic complaint relationship. Aims: The present study examined the degree 
to which worry and rumination mediated the relationship between neuroticism and somatic 
complaints. Method: A sample of 170 volunteers, recruited via convenience sampling, took 
part. Participants completed a series of self-report measures comprising the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire Revised-Short Form, Penn State Worry Questionnaire, the 
Ruminative Response Scale and the Somatic Symptom Scale-8. Results: Analysis revealed 
significant positive correlations between neuroticism, rumination and worry. Neuroticism, 
rumination and worry also correlated positively with somatic complaints. Using structural 
equation modelling, a mediational model indicated that rumination fully mediated the 
relationship between neuroticism and somatic complaints. Conclusions: Findings are 
consistent with the symptom perception hypothesis and have implications for healthcare in 
terms of managing individuals who present with multiple somatic complaints. Future 
research would benefit from adopting a longitudinal approach to test how rumination 
interacts with neuroticism and somatic complaints over time. 
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Introduction 
Costa and McCrae (1987, p. 301) define neuroticism as ‘a broad dimension of individual 
differences in the tendency to experience negative, distressing emotions and to possess 
associated behavioural and cognitive traits’. Consistent with this delineation neuroticism 
encompasses an array of negative traits (anger, hostility, sadness, irritability, vulnerability and 
self-consciousness) (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Concomitantly, research has established links 
between neuroticism, exaggerated negative and distressing emotionality, and the inclination 
to experience adverse life events (Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 1993).  
From an information processing perspective, high neuroticism correlates with the 
perceived inability to manage demanding situations (Clark & Watson, 2008) and sensitivity 
to environmental threat (Barlow, Ellard, Sauer-Zavala, Bullis, & Carl, 2014). Indeed, several 
preceding studies indicate that neuroticism influences perception of life events (Ozer & Benet-
Martinez, 2006), and can have incapacitating consequences on thinking (Suls & Martin, 
2005). In some cases this produces a ‘neurotic cascade’, where minor habitual problems 
become magnified (Hecht, 2013). Neurotic cascade refers to the notion that high neuroticism 
inclines individuals towards appraisal of events as harmful or threatening, and that ensuing 
negative affect carries over to contiguous experiences or thoughts, regardless of their valence 
(Ryckman & Lambert, 2015). In support of this supposition, Suls and Martin (2005) found 
that high (vs. low) neurotic individuals reported more daily problems, reacted with more 
severe emotions, experienced more residual emotion arising from previous events, and 
exhibited stronger reactions to recurring problems. 
Over time, neurotic temperament can result in the accumulation of negative and 
damaging cognitions (i.e., thoughts, associations and memories), which can adversely affect 
somatic health (Neeleman, Sytema, & Wadsworth, 2002). Theorists have explained the 
relationship between neuroticism and somatic complaints using a range of models (Neeleman, 
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Bijl, & Ormel, 2004). The symptom perception hypothesis (Costa & McCrae, 1987; Watson 
& Pennebaker, 1989) contends that high neuroticism increases perception of pain levels, 
which results in over reporting of physical grievances (Howren & Suls, 2011). This occurs 
because neurotic individuals possess an excessively sensitive behavioural inhibition system 
(BIS) (Pennebaker, 1982).  
The BIS regulates negative affect and avoidance behaviour in response to threats or 
punishment (Steimer, 2002). Hence, neuroticism is associated with heightened perception of 
stimuli as threatening (Gray, 1982). Accordingly, when neurotic individuals feel physical 
pains or aches, increased apprehension places them in a mental state that intensifies their 
current physical grievance. Within a conceptual analysis, Cioffi (1991) postulated that this 
results in incorrect appraisal of concurrent bodily sensations arising from neuroticism as 
symptoms of disease or illness. Consistent with this perspective, Cohen et al. (1995) reported 
that individuals with higher (vs. lower) levels of neuroticism reported increased common cold 
symptoms.  
This account is not universally accepted and alternative models exist. Notably, the 
disability and psychosomatic hypotheses (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). The disability 
hypothesis proposes accumulated health problems lead to personality changes, including the 
development of higher trait negative affect. Hence, neuroticism is a by-product, rather than a 
cause of poor physical health. Instead, the psychosomatic hypothesis proposes that neurotic 
individuals share negative personality traits that render them vulnerable to health issues (e.g., 
migraines and neck pain) (Rosmalen, Neeleman, Gans, & de Jonge, 2007). This perspective 
advances that neuroticism is associated with susceptibility to somatic complaints (Claridge & 
Davis, 2001). Indeed, Johnson (2003) found that neurotic individuals reported somatic 
complaints associated with prolonged tense mood state (i.e., increased migraines, higher blood 
pressure and more instances of neck pains). 
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 A prominent feature of neuroticism is the occurrence of recurrent, negative thoughts. 
These are associated also with anxiety and depressive disorders (Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, 
Franken, & Mayer, 2005). Indeed, neuroticism correlates strongly with depressive and anxiety 
symptoms (Jylhä & Isometsä, 2006). Within anxiety, unproductive repetitive cognitions 
manifest as worry, specifically the expectation that future events will result in adverse 
outcomes (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). Contrastingly, in depression, 
repetitive negative thoughts manifest as rumination, which denotes the tendency to focus on 
the nature, cause and consequences of depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). These 
conceptualizations indicate that worry and rumination are repetitive cognitive processes 
closely aligned to depressive and anxiety symptomology (Watkins, 2008). Correspondingly, 
research reports that worry and rumination relate strongly to a neurotic disposition (Lam, 
Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, & Sham, 2003).  
 In relation to the present study, Muris et al. (2005) examined relationships between 
neuroticism, rumination, worry, anxiety and depression. Following correlational analysis, 
Muris et al. (2005) observed that neuroticism, rumination and worry correlated. These factors 
related also to anxiety and depression. Pertinently, worry and rumination mediated the 
relationship between neuroticism and depression and anxiety. Specifically, neuroticism 
correlated with worry and rumination, which in turn were associated with anxiety and 
depression. It is important to note that although rumination and worry positively correlated, 
the relationship between the two constructs was only in the moderate to low range; the 
variables shared only approximately 10% variance. Moreover, previous factor analytical 
studies have found that worry and rumination items load on separate dimensions (Fresco, 
Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004; 
Hoyer, Gloster, & Herzberg, 2009). Subsequent work supports this notion. Particularly, Hoyer 
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et al. (2009) found that worry was more predictive of anxiety whereas rumination was a 
greater predictor of depression. 
Generally, worry links to anxiety, especially generalized anxiety disorder, whereas 
rumination is associated with depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). The reasons why worry 
and rumination differ in this way is due to worry comprising a focus on potential negative 
future outcomes (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998), whereas rumination incorporates a focus 
on the past and/or present, and on negative symptoms (Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 
2000). 
 Research has linked rumination and worry with somatic complaints. Rumination 
relates to both perceived impairment in somatic health and genuine somatic distress. For 
example, rumination correlated with self-reported somatic complaints in Dutch and British 
children (Miers, Rieffe, Terwogt, Cowan, & Linden, 2007) and health anxiety among US 
college students (Marcus, Hughes, & Arnau, 2008). Additionally, Zoccola (2010) established 
associations between rumination and cortisol response, and Hogan and Linden (2004) found 
rumination negatively impacted blood pressure levels (resting and ambulatory). Worry is 
associated with various somatic complaints, including pain (Borkovec, 1994). Brosschot and 
van der Doef (2006) found worry to be associated prospectively with general somatic 
complaints (pain, dizziness, headache, etc.).  
 Building on previous work, the current study examined whether worry and rumination 
mediated the relationship between neuroticism and somatic complaints. Identification of the 
mechanisms that play a prominent role in the materialisation and/or the maintenance of this 
relationship has important clinical and health implications. Particularly, individuals with 
multiple somatic symptoms are an increasing health care problem, and currently represent 
approximately half of all primary care visits (Janca, Isaac, & Ventouras, 2006). 
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In addition, somatic symptoms are a costly burden to healthcare systems in general, 
correlating positively with disability, healthcare use and sick leave (De Gucht & Maes, 2006). 
Primary care patients typically present with somatic complaints. In comparison to patients 
reporting minimal to no symptoms, individuals with greater levels of somatic symptoms use 
more inpatient and outpatient medical care and cost twice as much annually (Barsky, Orav, & 
Bates, 2005). Thus, it is important to increase cognisance of the factors that influence the 
tendency to report somatic symptoms. This will help to reduce false symptoms and increase 
awareness around the detection and treatment of genuine symptoms. 
Furthermore, a lack of research has examined links between worry and general somatic 
complaints (Brosschot & van der Doef, 2006), and assessed rumination and worry as potential 
mediators between neuroticism and somatic complaints. An assessment of indirect effects in 
this relationship is important for healthcare implications because worry and rumination 
represent cognitive processes that are to an extent malleable (Danielsson, Harvey, 
MacDonald, Jansson-Fröjmark, & Linton, 2013; Jacobs et al., 2016). If found to mediate, 
these processes provide a modifiable focus to help lessen the burden on primary healthcare of 
individuals presenting with multiple somatic complaints. 
 
Method 
Participants  
A convenience sample of 170 participants took part in the present study (64 males, 106 
females). Sixty (35%) were undergraduate students. Mean age was 29.60 (SD = 13.80), with 
an age range of 18 to 72. Participant recruitment was via emails to university students/staff 
and local stakeholders (businesses, leisure and vocational/sports classes). The only exclusion 
criterion was age. Involvement discontinued if potential participants were younger than 18 
years of age. 
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Measures 
The neuroticism subscale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised-Short Form 
assessed neuroticism (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985). This comprised 12 dichotomous 
questions with a binary response, ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Example items include, ‘does your mood often 
go up and down?’ (item 1), and ‘are you an irritable person?’ (item 3). Level of neuroticism 
and emotional instability increase as a function of score. The subscale possesses satisfactory 
internal consistency (α = .77, Tiwari, Singh, & Singh, 2009). In this study internal reliability 
was good (α = .80). 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) measured trait-like worry, operationalized as the inclination to engage in extreme, 
generalized, and unmanageable worry. This consisted of 16 items with an accompanying five-
point scale from 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (very much like me). Example items include, ‘my 
worries overwhelm me’ (item 2), and ‘when I am under pressure I worry a lot’ (item 6).  The 
PSWQ possesses good reported internal reliability (α = .93, Meyer et al., 1990). Internal 
reliability in the present study was excellent (α = .91). 
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) 
assessed trait-like rumination. This has 22 items, which consider ruminative coping responses 
in relation to a depressed mood state. Example items include, ‘why can’t I handle things 
better?’ (item 16), and ‘what am I doing to deserve this?’ (item 5). The measure incorporates 
a four-point response scale, ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). The RRS has 
good reported internal consistency (α = .90, McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). In this 
study, internal reliability was excellent (α = .94). 
The Somatic Symptom Scale-8 (SSS-8; Gierk et al., 2014) measured participants’ 
vulnerability towards somatic complaints. Statements index the extent to which specific 
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somatic ailments have affected participants within the past seven days. The SSS-8 consists of 
8-items assessed via a five-point scale, from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Example ailments 
include, ‘chest pain or shortness of breath’ (item 5), and ‘dizziness’ (item 6). The scale 
possesses good alpha reliability (α = .80, Gierk et al., 2014). Internal reliability in the current 
study was good (α = .83). 
 
Procedure 
Prospective participants read the information sheet (detailing the study’s purpose and 
participant rights) and provided informed consent before taking part. On completion of the 
survey, participants were debriefed. The order of questionnaires on the survey rotated across 
participants to prevent order effects. All aspects of the study followed the protocols and 
procedures outlined within the British Psychological Society ethical guidelines, and the 
University Ethics Committee approved the study prior to data collection. 
 
Analysis Plan  
Analysis comprised two related phases. The first examined variable means, standard 
deviations and zero-order correlations. The second employed structural equation modelling 
(SEM) using AMOS 23. Consistent with Anderson and Gerbing (1988), the first stage of 
SEM analysis tested a measurement model depicting all latent variables (neuroticism, worry, 
rumination and somatic complaints) as covarying with one another. Item parceling within 
latent variables initially occurred to enhance the statistical power and degrees of freedom of 
models (Coffman & MacCallum, 2005). A further advantage of item parceling is that latent 
variables are more likely to be normally distributed and to satisfy the assumptions of the 
maximum likelihood method (Thompson & Melancon, 1996). Exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) with oblique (promax) rotation tested items pertaining to each latent variable. Factor 
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loadings informed item to parcel allocation in descending order (Coffman & MacCallum, 
2005). Comparison of item content with results from relevant research informed the 
identification of factor labels. The second stage of SEM analysis tested the fit of a mediation 
model that assumed neuroticism would have an indirect effect on somatic complaints via 
cognitive processes of rumination and worry. 
Absolute (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual, SRMR and Root-Mean-Square 
Error of Approximation, RMSEA) and incremental indices (the Comparative Fit Index, CFI 
and the Incremental Fit Index, IFI) assessed model fit. Absolute indices indicate the degree 
to which a priori models fit sample data (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008), while 
incremental indices compare chi-square results with baseline models (Hooper et al., 2008). 
 According to Brown and Cudeck (1993), an acceptable model requires SRMR < .08, 
RMSEA < .08, CFI > .90 and IFI > .90. CFI and IFI values of .86 to .90, SRMR and RMSEA 
values of .08 to .10 indicate marginal fit (Nigg et al., 2009). The 90% confidence interval 
was included when reporting RMSEA. Bootstrapping estimates (resampled 5000 times using 
the bias-corrected percentile method to create 95% confidence intervals) tested indirect 
effects. Model comparison considered Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) where relevant, 
with lower values supporting superior fit (Dagnall, Denovan, Drinkwater, Parker, & Clough, 
2016). 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Prior to conducting the inferential tests, it was confirmed that data met the assumption of no 
multicollinearity for neuroticism (Tolerance = .49, VIF = 2.01), worry (Tolerance = .59, VIF 
= 1.69) and rumination (Tolerance = .51, VIF = 1.75). Furthermore, data met the assumption 
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of independent errors (Durbin-Watson value = 1.8); scatterplots revealed no issues with 
linearity or homoscedasticity.  
 Neuroticism correlated positively with worry, r (168) = .63, p < .001, rumination, r 
(168) = .62, p < .001, and somatic complaints, r (168) = .30, p = < .001. Worry correlated 
positively and significantly with rumination, r (168) = .53, p < .001, and somatic complaints, 
r (168) = .30 p < .001. Finally, rumination correlated positively with somatic complaints, r 
(168) = .38, p < .001 (see Table 1).  
The correlation between worry and rumination lessened when neuroticism was 
controlled, partial r = .23, p = .002. Even when shared variance for each of the respective 
cognitive variables was controlled correlations between worry and neuroticism (partial r = 
.45, p < .001) and between rumination and neuroticism (partial r = .43, p < .001) remained 
within the moderate range. Lastly, the correlation between neuroticism and somatic 
complaints disappeared (partial r = .03) when worry and rumination were controlled.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
Model test 
Results from EFA (to establish item parcels) indicated that neuroticism possessed three-
factors (all loadings > .4 apart from items 12 and 8) accounting for 53.6% of variance. Factor 
1 (item 5, 1, 11, 2, 3, 12) ‘moody’, factor 2 (item 10, 6, 7, 8) ‘tense’, and factor 3 (item 4, 9) 
‘nervous’. These conceptualizations were consistent with Lauriola and Iani (2015). Worry 
comprised two factors (all items loaded above .4) explaining 57.2% variance. Factor 1 (items 
5, 16, 7, 14, 9, 15, 13, 6, 12, 4, 2) ‘worry engagement’, and Factor 2 (items 11, 1, 10, 8, 3) 
‘absence of worry’. Factor labelling was consistent with Zhong, Wang, Li, and Liu (2009). 
Three factors emerged for rumination (all > .4 apart from items 14, 8), accounting for 58.9% 
of variance. Factor 1 (items 16, 18, 15, 17, 10, 22, 13, 20) ‘brooding’, factor 2 (items 3, 6, 
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19, 9, 2, 5, 14, 1) ‘depression’, and factor 3 (items 12, 21, 11, 7, 8) ‘reflection’. Apart from 
a couple of minor inconsistencies, this structure replicated that of Treynor et al. (2003). 
Somatic complaints comprised one factor explaining 50.26% of variance. This was congruent 
with research supporting a single general factor (Gierk et al., 2014). The measurement model 
indicated acceptable fit on all criteria, but RMSEA, χ2 (22, N = 170) = 88.37, p < .001, CFI 
= .91, IFI = .91, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .13 (CI of .11 to .16), and all factor loadings were 
significant (p < .001).  
 A structural mediation model (Model 1) (see Figure 1) reported acceptable fit on all 
criteria, but RMSEA, χ2 (23, N = 170) = 89.50, p < .001, CFI = .91, IFI = .91, SRMR = .07, 
RMSEA = .13 (CI of .10 to .16). Inspection of structural paths revealed that neuroticism 
significantly predicted higher levels of worry, β = .79, p < .001, and rumination, β = .73, p < 
.001. Rumination significantly predicted higher levels of somatic complaints, β = .31, p = 
.014. However, worry did not significantly predict somatic complaints, β = .06, p = .698. 
Additionally, neuroticism did not significantly predict somatic complaints, β = .10, p = .651. 
Bootstrapping estimates revealed neuroticism had a significant indirect effect on somatic 
complaints across bias-corrected percentile point estimates (p = .001, 95% Cl = .17 to .54).  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
It is not immediately obvious, though, which proposed mediator (worry or 
rumination) is responsible for the mediating effect because AMOS cannot examine the 
unique influence of two or more mediators when simultaneously included in SEM. The 
observation that only rumination significantly predicted somatic complaints, suggested that 
neuroticism might have an indirect effect through rumination. Specification of an alternative 
model (Model 2) assessed this notion (see Figure 2). This removed paths linked to worry. 
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Model 2 reported good fit on all indices, but RMSEA which suggested marginal fit, χ2 (12, 
N = 170) = 28.21, p = .005, CFI = .97, IFI = .97, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .08 (CI of .05 to 
.10). A comparison of AIC statistics indicated superior fit for Model 2 (AIC = 74.22) vs. 
Model 1 (AIC = 151.51). As with Model 1, structural paths revealed neuroticism predicted 
higher levels of rumination, β = .70, p < .001, and rumination predicted greater somatic 
complaints, β = .29, p = .006. Additionally, neuroticism did not significantly predict somatic 
complaints, β = .18, p = .109. Bootstrapping estimates indicated that neuroticism had an 
indirect effect on somatic complaints through rumination across bias-corrected percentile 
point estimates (p < .001, 95% Cl = .24 to .52). The indirect effect was .38. This indicated a 
.38 standard deviation increase in somatic complaints for every one-unit increase in 
neuroticism indirectly via rumination. Presence of a significant indirect effect, a non-
significant path between neuroticism and somatic complaints, and a significant relationship 
between neuroticism and rumination support full mediation. The model explained 50% of 
the variance in rumination and 19% of the variance in somatic complaints.  
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
  
As Model 2 is cross-sectional, further models were tested. These examined plausible 
alternative solutions. One model examined neuroticism as a mediator between rumination 
and somatic complaints (Model 3), another included somatic complaints as a mediator 
between rumination and neuroticism (Model 4). Analysis revealed identical data-model fit in 
comparison with Model 2 (only direction altered). However, significant indirect effects were 
not apparent in either analysis. A further model (Model 5) tested whether somatic complaints 
mediated the relationship between neuroticism and rumination. The indirect effect was 
weaker (.07). In addition, the predictive relationship between neuroticism and the outcome 
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was stronger (.63 vs. .18) and significant vs. non-significant, indicating a weaker presence of 
a mediating variable. A final analysis (Model 6) examined rumination as a mediator between 
somatic complaints and neuroticism, which reported a significant, albeit weaker indirect 
effect (.27). The presence of a stronger indirect effect in Model 2 is, according to Zhao, Lynch 
and Chen (2010), evidence of stronger mediation and indicates that the pattern of 
relationships proposed in the study hypotheses more convincingly represent the data. Overall, 
the results of these alternative tests support the direction among the variables proposed in 
Model 2. 
 
Discussion 
This paper investigated whether worry and rumination mediated the relationship between 
neuroticism and vulnerability to somatic complaints. Analysis revealed significant 
correlations (medium to high) between factors. However, worry and rumination were 
associated differently with neuroticism and somatic complaints. Explicitly, rumination 
mediated the neuroticism and somatic complaints association, whereas worry did not have a 
meaningful influence on this relationship. 
 Previous research has often explored relationships between worry, rumination, 
neuroticism and somatic complaints using correlation. Hence, in order to enable comparisons 
with preceding work it is necessary to consider zero-order correlations obtained within the 
current study. In agreement with earlier investigations, worry and rumination were 
moderately associated (Fresco et al., 2002; Muris et al., 2004; Segerstrom et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, these factors were moderately associated with neuroticism. Controlling for 
neuroticism reduced the correlation between worry and rumination demonstrating conceptual 
overlap between these constructs. Hence, findings indicated that rumination and worry are, 
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in part, manifestations of neuroticism. Indeed, neuroticism explained a meaningful 
proportion of shared variance among these constructs.  
Neuroticism correlated positively with somatic complaints. This observation accords 
with preceding studies (e.g., Cohen et al., 1995). The absence of an association between 
neuroticism and somatic complaints, after controlling for worry and rumination, suggests that 
these cognitive factors play an important direct role in the neuroticism-somatic complaints 
relationship. The finding that rumination (not worry) mediated the association between 
neuroticism and somatic complaints relationship reflects the importance of rumination. This 
result agrees with Thomsen et al. (2004). They argued that rumination, by centering attention 
on negative material, directly influences perceived health. In this context, somatic symptoms 
(e.g., pain, headaches) act as instances of negative material. Additionally, rumination sustains 
focus on potential physical problems (headaches, pain, aches, etc.) and augments pain 
sensitivity (Villemure & Bushnell, 2002).  
The current findings were consistent with the symptom perception hypothesis 
(Howren & Suls, 2011).  This proposes that, ‘neurotic individuals are more likely to perceive, 
overact to, and/or complain about minor physical problems and sensations’ (Rosmalen et al., 
2007, p. 305). Accordingly, participants with higher levels of neuroticism report more 
somatic symptoms because they are inclined to focus internally on self-generated bodily 
feelings and sensations. Once detected a negative interpretative bias arising from neuroticism 
results in the perception of symptoms as indicators of illness (Williams, O'Brien, & Colder, 
2004).  
Thus, rumination provides a potential explanatory mechanism for internal focus. 
Rumination represents a self-absorbing focus on depressing stimuli, symptoms and a 
difficulty in detaching oneself from this introspection (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). This 
definition is consistent with the view that self-focus on symptoms is a defining feature of 
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rumination. The current findings suggest that this extends to the perception of somatic 
symptoms.  Moreover, within an alternative mediational model neuroticism did not vary as 
strongly as a function of somatic complaints. This contradicted the disability hypothesis, 
which assumes neuroticism is the consequence (not the cause) of ill health (Rosmalen et al., 
2007).  
Although the findings generally accord with the symptom perception hypothesis, 
specifically the notion that neuroticism is associated with a lower threshold for detecting 
somatic symptoms, it is important to note that somatic complaints can actually reflect poor 
health. Indeed, genuine symptoms may give rise to neuroticism, worry and anxiety. Thus, 
because the study was not causal readers should interpret the findings and suggested 
implications cautiously. At a general level, it is essential to increase awareness of somatic 
symptoms. Particularly, to reduce false symptoms but remain conscious of the need to detect 
and treat real symptoms. 
In the present study, it was unclear why worry failed to mediate the neuroticism-
somatic complaint relationship. It is possible that this was due to differences in the content 
of worry and rumination. Specifically, a principal feature of worry is a focus on prospective 
negative consequences (Borkovec et al., 1998). Additionally, reduced concreteness and the 
tendency to divert attention away from arousing, negative and/or painful material (e.g., 
somatic symptoms) are prominent features of worrisome thought (Borkovec et al., 1998). 
This suggests that worry functions as a form of cognitive distraction. 
Although reduced concreteness also characterizes ruminative thought (Watkins & 
Moulds, 2007) rumination tends to focus on the past and/or present and comprises self-
focused attention (Segerstrom et al., 2000). Hence, rumination promotes a focus on arousing, 
negative and/or painful material (Hoyer et al., 2009). This distinction potentially explains 
why rumination more directly predicted symptom reporting than worry. It would be useful 
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for subsequent research to assess this conceptualization further. This would greatly enhance 
understanding of the relationship between neuroticism and somatic complaints. 
 Previous work supports the view that worry and rumination are conceptually related 
but distinct cognitive processes (Hoyer et al., 2009; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Yang et al., 
2014). For example, Yang et al. (2014) found that worry and rumination played a differential 
role in the diagnosis of major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD). Worry increased the likelihood of a diagnosis of GAD, whereas rumination was 
associated with greater odds of an MDD diagnosis. Based on this, Yang et al. (2014) 
concluded that worry and rumination possess unique features that influence diagnostic 
outcomes. Thus, although the presence of repetitive negative thinking is a defining feature 
of both cognitive processes, the actual contents of thought differ (Yang et al., 2014). 
Following on from this previous research, subsequent studies should assess the degree to 
which worry and rumination differentially affect reporting of somatic symptoms. 
Furthermore, repetitive negative thinking is common within a range of Axis I 
disorders (e.g., panic attacks, obsession, social phobia) (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). In this 
context, similarities between worry and rumination are transdiagnostic. They represent 
central criteria (i.e., repetitive, passive and/or relatively uncontrollable and focused thought), 
which embody common features of repetitive negative thinking. This is congruent with 
Ehring and Watkins’ (2008) definition of negative thinking as repetitive thinking about one 
or more negative topics that is experienced as difficult to control. 
Clear clinical implications follow from the observation that rumination is associated 
with the reporting of somatic symptoms. Particularly in the context of individuals presenting 
with multiple somatic complaints in primary healthcare. Treating these individuals is both 
time and resource intensive (Tylee & Gandhi, 2005). Focusing on strategies to reduce 
rumination may help to alleviate this burden. A number of existing therapeutic techniques 
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exist, which could serve this function. For example, rumination-focused cognitive 
behavioural therapy is effective for tackling excessive self-focus (Watkins et al., 2007). In 
addition, rumination-cued activation involves educating individuals to understand when and 
why they are ruminating (Addis & Martell, 2004). Future work could usefully examine the 
effects of rumination reduction, via established therapeutic methods, in relation to 
neuroticism and somatic complaints using controlled trials. 
It is important to acknowledge the presence of limitations within the present study. 
Firstly, the study was cross-sectional. Collecting data at one time point, prevents the 
establishment of cause-effect relations. However, extant research provides a framework in 
which to interpret findings. Specifically, neuroticism is a relatively stable personality trait 
with a genetic basis (Flint, 2004), whereas worry and rumination are cognitive processes. 
This is consistent with previous work, which has examined worry and rumination as 
mediators of the effects of neuroticism (e.g., Muris et al., 2005), supporting the proposed 
conceptualization in this study.  
Longitudinal research would test how rumination is associated with neuroticism and 
somatic complaints over time by providing repeated assessments in accordance with 
designated time intervals. Analysis of lagged effects of neuroticism through rumination could 
examine how mediation effects unfold. This would build on the current study and further 
determine how somatic complaints vary as a function of rumination in response to 
neuroticism. 
Secondly, given 19% of variance in somatic complaints was accounted for, variables 
not assessed in this study may enhance understanding of the observed mediation effect. A 
specific example is interoceptive awareness (body awareness). Interoceptive awareness and 
negative self-referential thought (e.g., rumination) represent integrated processes (Lackner 
& Fresco, 2016). Research indicates that interoceptive awareness interacts with rumination 
 19 
in relation to the reporting of somatic complaints (e.g., pain) (Scheuren, Sütterlin, & Anton, 
2014). Interoceptive awareness, then, may complement the assessment of somatic complaints 
in the context of neuroticism and rumination. Broadening the focus to include additional 
variables is important for mediation analysis given this method is limited in the sense it does 
not account for unmeasured variables (i.e., constructs that may correlate with rumination) 
that can drive the relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables (i.e., 
neuroticism and somatic complaints). 
Thirdly, self-report measures potentially influence data in adverse ways, by 
introducing response bias and shared method variance (Denovan, Dagnall, Dhingra, & 
Grogan, 2017). Incorporating physiological measures can add concurrent validity to the 
assessment of worry and rumination, given these are associated with arousal in the form of 
higher cardiovascular activity (Borkovec et al., 1988; Hogan & Linden, 2004). Finally, this 
study used a non-clinical sample. Consequently, generalizing the findings to a clinical sample 
is difficult to achieve. This is problematic because the individuals mostly likely to benefit 
from the current research are those within clinical samples.  
Overall, the current study indicates that moderate relationships exist among 
neuroticism, worry and rumination. In addition, rumination mediated the relationship 
between neuroticism and somatic complaints. It makes sense, therefore, for future research 
to corroborate the mediating role of rumination given this cognitive process can be modified 
using appropriate therapeutic techniques (Addis & Martell, 2004; Watkins et al., 2007). Such 
work can have important implications for healthcare systems in terms of managing 
individuals who present with multiple somatic complaints. 
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Table 1 Means, standard deviations and correlations among all study variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Neuroticism 5.22 3.22  .63** .62** .30** 
2. Worry 45.14 13.36   .53** .30** 
3. Rumination 34.16 11.09    .38** 
4. Somatic Complaints 7.90 7.27     
Note. **p < .001 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model 1: Mediational effects of rumination and worry on the relationship between 
neuroticism and somatic complaints Note. Latent variables are represented by ellipses; 
observed variables are represented by rectangles; error of measurement is indicated by ‘e’; * 
p < .05, ** p < .001 
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Figure 2. Model 2: Mediational effects of rumination on the relationship between 
neuroticism and somatic complaints Note. Latent variables are represented by ellipses; 
observed variables are represented by rectangles; error of measurement is indicated by ‘e’; * 
p < .05, ** p < .001 
